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USING THE TENTH AMENDMENT TO PREVENT 
FOREST FIRES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
PROPERTY CLAUSE AND TENTH AMENDMENT 
IN UNITED STATES V. BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF COUNTY OF OTERO 
Ryan F. Adragna 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In July 2016, residents of Timberon, a small town located on the edge of 
Lincoln National Forest in Otero County, New Mexico, returned home to find their 
houses reduced to ashes.1 They were victims of a forest fire that had quickly spread 
due to the dry, arid conditions in Otero County.2 Unfortunately, such scenes are all 
too common. Wildfires burning throughout the country have become a growing 
national concern.3 Time and time again people are forced to evacuate their homes 
because forest fires, fueled by dry undergrowth, have burned their communities.4 
When a community is faced with such dangers it must protect itself. This same 
rationale motivated the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Otero to 
take preemptive measures to thin and clear dangerous dry undergrowth that posed a 
serious conflagratory threat of causing the same destruction residents of Timberon 
experienced. Otero County’s protective measures, however, were halted by the 
Federal Government, who used authority granted to it by the Property Clause of the 
Federal Constitution to assert complete authority over National Forest land in Otero 
County.5 
This Case Note will focus on the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
Property Clause in the recent decision of United States v. Board of County 
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 1. Kayla Root & Katherine Mozzone, Dozens Evacuate in Otero County, 10 Structures Burned in 
Fire, KRQE NEWS 13 (July 13, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://krqe.com/2016/07/13/fire-burning-100-acres-in-
otero-county-10-structures-burned/. 
 2. Timberon Fire 40% Contained, 44 Dwellings Destroyed, KRQE NEWS 13 (July 15, 2016, 12:18 
PM), http://krqe.com/2016/07/15 /timberon-fire-15-contained-forest-officials-confirm-67-structures-
lost/1019927290. 
 3. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Wildfire, Wildlands and People: Preparing for Fire in the Wildland-
Urban Interface 1, https://www.fs.fed.us/openspace/fote/reports/GTR-299.pdf (2013). 
 4. See generally id. at 16. 
 5. This point will be fleshed out in detail below. 
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Commissioners of County of Otero.6 Part II of this Case Note will summarize the 
Property Clause and its jurisprudence as used by the Tenth Circuit. Next, Part III of 
this Case Note will examine the reasoning used by both the district court and court 
of appeals in deciding County of Otero. Part IV of this Note will explore the Tenth 
Amendment’s recent revival. Lastly, Part V of this Note will analyze how the, Tenth 
Amendment not the Property Clause, should have decided County of Otero. 
A. Facts giving rise to United States v. Board of County Commissioners of the 
County of Otero. 
In the wake of terrible fires originating on federal lands and in response to 
the continuing fire risks from drought, the New Mexico legislature passed NMSA 
1978, § 4-36-11 (“State Law”) in 2001.7 The State Law effectively provided local 
governments with the authority to enter federal lands in order to thin and clear 
undergrowth and take other preventative measures to combat the risk of fire.8 The 
legislature expressly stated its motive for passing the State Law was the United States 
Forest Service’s inaction in preventing or removing conditions which led to forest 
fires.9 In 2011, pursuant to the State Law, the Board of County Commissioners of 
County of Otero (“Otero County”) passed Resolution Number 05-23-11/99-50 
(“Resolution”) enabling the county to take certain preventative measures to reduce 
fire hazards within the County, which is comprised of seventy-five percent federal 
lands.10 
After Otero County passed the Resolution, the County devised a plan to 
target certain areas of the Lincoln National Forest that were hazardous and 
flammable.11 The County communicated this plan to the United States Forest Service 
(“Forest Service”) and indicated it would carry out the plan with or without the Forest 
Service’s consent.12 In response the Forest Service communicated their disapproval 
of the plan and refused to authorize it.13 Consequently, tension arose between the 
Forest Service and Otero County, and culminated in the Otero County Sheriff stating 
that he would arrest any Forest Service officer impeding the County’s plan.14 Small 
 
 6. United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Cty. of Otero, 843 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2016), cert 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 84 (U.S. 2017). 
 7. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-36-11 (2001), invalidated by United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of the 
Cty. of Otero, 184 F.3d 1097 (D.N.M. 2015). 
 8. See id. The law required the State or County to consult with the state forester, but need not require 
federal approval to be obtained. Id. 
 9. See id. (“[B]ecause the United States forest service has failed to exercise its responsibilities as a 
sovereign to protect the lives and property of the citizens of New Mexico and because it is a fundamental 
principle under the laws of any just society that the persistent failure of a sovereign to fulfill such 
obligations constitutes grounds for the forfeiture of jurisdictional supremacy, such a forfeiture must 
hereby be recognized and declared.”). 
 10. See County of Otero, 843 F.3d at 1210. 
 11. See United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of the Cty. of Otero, 184 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1103 
(D.N.M. 2015). 
 12. See id. at 1104. The State Law did not require the forest service’s consent, but rather a simple 
consultation with the state forester regarding plans to abate fire hazards. See § 4-36-11(C). 
 13. See County of Otero, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 1104. 
 14. See id. 
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portions of the plan to reduce wild fires were ultimately carried out by the County.15 
However, before the full-scale plan could be executed, the United States brought suit 
against the State of New Mexico and the County for declaratory and injunctive relief 
to declare the State Law and the Resolution in conflict with, and thus preempted by, 
federal law.16 
B. An overview of United States v. Board of County Commissioners of County 
of Otero. 
In United States v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Otero,17 
the federal appellate case resulting from the United States’ lawsuit, the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the decision of The United States District Court for the District of New 
Mexico, which held that the State Law and Resolution were preempted by federal 
law. Specifically, the district court held that the State Law and Resolution were 
preempted by a federal regulatory exception (“Federal Law”) that prohibited “cutting 
or otherwise damaging any timber, tree, or other forest product in the absence of 
[federal authorization].”18 In ruling that Federal Law preempted the statute and 
ordinance, the district court relied on the proposition that the Property Clause of the 
United States Constitution19 granted the Federal Government, through the Forrest 
Service, plenary power over federal lands.20 Thus, the issue before the Tenth Circuit 
was whether “the Property Clause of the Constitution so thoroughly preempt state 
power that a state may not, under any circumstances, remove a deadly and 
destructive nuisance from National Forrest lands even where the United States 
refuses or fails to remove that danger itself.”21 In affirming the district court’s ruling, 
the Tenth Circuit held that Kleppe v. New Mexico,22 Wyoming v. United States,23 and 
other binding precedents affirmatively answered that, under the Property Clause, 
state law must yield to federal law when federal land is at issue.24 
 
 15. See id. at 1105. 
 16. See id. at 1102. 
 17. United States. v. Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Cty. of Otero, 843 F.3d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 2016), 
cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 84 (U.S. 2017). 
 18. 36 C.F.R. §261.6 (1977). 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2. The full text of the Property Clause reads: “The Congress shall 
have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to 
prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.” Id. In essence, the Property Clause 
gives the Federal Government legislative power over federal property. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 
426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976) (holding that Congress has expansive power over federal property pursuant to 
the Property Clause). 
 20. See County of Otero, 843 F.3d 1208, 1211. 
 21. Id. (emphasis added). 
 22. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). See infra Part III(B) for a detailed explanation of 
Kleppe. 
 23. Wyoming v. United States 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002). See infra Part III(C) for a detailed 
explanation of Wyoming. 
 24. See County of Otero, 843 F.3d at 1212–13, 1215. 
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II. THE PROPERTY CLAUSE 
Article Four, Section Three, Clause Two of the United States Constitution 
provides: “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and 
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United 
States.”25 This clause, commonly referred to as the “Property Clause”, grants 
Congress its primary authority over federal lands, and is the primary authority for 
the Federal Government’s ownership of land.26 Through the Property Clause, the 
Federal Government owns land in all fifty states.27 In New Mexico alone the Federal 
Government has title to over 7.7 million acres of land, which equates to roughly 
thirty-five percent of the land in the state.28 Despite the broad reach of the Property 
Clause, the Clause itself has seen little attention in academic commentary.29 Indeed, 
the United States Supreme Court has not visited the Property Clause in nearly forty 
years.30 While this Case Note does not seek to provide a comprehensive history of 
the Property Clause,31 a brief history of the Clause is necessary. 
A. The Property Clause’s origin and early case law. 
The Property Clause was ratified along with the rest of the Constitution.32 
The policy underlying the drafting of the Property Clause was the Federal 
Government’s need to control the anticipated acquisition of western territories.33 
Unlike the Enclave Clause,34 which yields exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal 
 
 25. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl.2. 
 26. See, e.g., Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause and 
Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001). 
 27. See CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 7–8 
(2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf (compiling data from the most recent federal reports 
regarding statistics of federal land ownership). 
 28. See id. at 8. 
 29. See, e.g., Appel, supra note 26, at 6 (“[S]cholars of Constitutional Law have largely ignored the 
[Property] Clause.”); Allison H. Eid, The Property Clause and New Federalism, 75 U. COLO. L. REV 
1241, at 1241 (2004) n.6; (“The Property Clause has garnered very little attention from constitutional law 
commentators in recent years.”); Peter Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation” in 
the Twenty-First Century, 24 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 25, 26 (2004) (“Interest in the Property 
Clause is surprisingly thin.”); Ronald F. Frank & John H. Eckhard, Power of Congress Under the Clause 
to Give Extraterritorial Effect to Federal Lands Law: Will “Respecting Property” Go the Way of 
“Affecting Commerce”?, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 663, 664 (1983)(“[T]he Property Clause has received 
scant attention by the courts and by Congress.”); Cf. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(Rachel E. Barkow et. al. eds, 5th ed. 2017) and KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Robert C. Clark et al. eds, 19th ed. 2016) (leading constitutional law textbooks 
lacking any substantive information on the Property Clause). 
 30. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (last Supreme Court decision to cast any 
meaningful interpretation of the Property Clause); see also Appel, supra note 26, at 75 (2001) (“The most 
recent exposition of the Property Clause from the Supreme Court came in Kleppe v. New Mexico.”). 
 31. For a thorough history of the Property Clause see Appel, supra note 26, at 10–79. 
 32. See generally Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention and the Constitution’s Property 
Clause: The Original Understanding, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 327, 332 (2005). 
 33. Id. at 359–361. 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The Enclave Clause provides that Congress may, with a state’s 
consensual cession of land, build “Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.” 
Id. Once land is ceded to the Federal Government, that particular land is subject to the exclusive 
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Government, the Property Clause was intended to give Congress concurrent 
jurisdiction over lands within a given state.35 
Throughout history, the Property Clause’s power has been consistently 
interpreted broadly.36 Early case law on the Property Clause was no exception. For 
example, nineteenth century Property Clause jurisprudence set forth that Congress 
was constitutionally allowed to exercise complete power over newly acquired 
jurisdictions,37 lease federal lands to whomever it saw fit,38 and could regulate private 
conduct on private property within a state.39 Indeed, the Property Clause was deemed 
to give the government undoubtable “power over its own property analogous to the 
police power of the several States, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise 
of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case.”40 The Court 
underpinned this approach by stating that anything less would “place the public 
domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation.”41 Thus, 
nineteenth century case law on the Property Clause found the clause to have 
expansive reaches.42 
The Property Clause would only become stronger as twentieth-century case 
law not only upheld the Property Clause’s broad power, but furthered its reach. In 
the vast expanses of the west, where federal regulations of land were becoming more 
frequent, the Property Clause was adjudged to give the United States both rights and 
authority as proprietor and sovereign.43 As both proprietor and sovereign the United 
States can freely exercise Congressional legislation, even if that legislation conflicts 
 
jurisdiction of the United States. See Spencer Driscoll, Utah’s Enabling Act and Congress’s Enclave 
Clause Authority: Federalism Implications of a Renewed State Sovereignty Movement, 2012 BYU L. REV. 
999, 1000 (2012). Essentially, the Enclave Clause gives Congress the ability to purchase land for 
government installations (military bases, post offices, etc.) and also grants Congress exclusive control 
over the seat of the national government (Washington D.C.). Id. 
 35. See Natelson, supra note 32 at 359. 
 36. See, e.g., Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539 (“And while the furthest reaches of the Property Clause have 
not yet been definitely resolved, we have repeatedly observed that, ‘the power over public land thus 
entrusted to Congress is without limitations.’”); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840) (finding 
that the Property Clause’s power “is vested in Congress without limitation.”). 
 37. See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 542 (1828) (stating that power to govern 
United States territories was constitutionally “within the power and jurisdiction of the United States.”). 
 38. See Gratiot, 39 U.S. 538 (“The disposal must be left to the discretion of Congress.”). 
 39. See United States v. Camfield, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) (finding that the Federal Government 
could prohibit what were essentially spite fences built on private land to enclose federal land). 
 40. Id. at 525. 
 41. Id. at 526; see also Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 390 (1917) (placing 
emphasis on this quote). 
 42. The only significant departure from the nineteenth century’s broad approach to the Property 
Clause came in the infamous Dred Scott decision, where the Court interpreted the Clause narrowly in 
order to repudiate Congress’ ability to regulate slavery in federal territories. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. 393, 497 (1857). The Dred Scott court held the Property Clause applied only to “ships, arms, and 
munitions of war, which then belonged in common to the State sovereignties. Id. at 437. This narrow view 
of the Property Clause was, however, short-lived when Dred Scott’s holding regarding the Clause was 
overruled in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 43. See, e.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1918) (finding that federal grazing 
regulations in Colorado were constitutionally permissible because under the Property Clause United States 
has “rights incident to proprietorship, to say nothing of the power of the United States as a sovereign over 
the property belonging to it.”). 
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with state law.44 More so, in some instances the United States can freely exercise this 
power even if that power is exercised on privately owned land. For instance, the 
Court in United States v. Alford45 held that, through the Property Clause, “Congress 
may prohibit the doing of acts upon privately owned lands that imperil the publicly 
owned forests.”46 In Alford, Alford was indicted for violating a statute that mandated 
he extinguish a fire built entirely on private land.47 This fire was “near inflammable 
grass and other inflammable material and timber situated upon the public domain of 
the United States.”48 In other words, Alford was convicted for his actions on private 
land because they potentially affected public land. The Court used the Property 
Clause to uphold the statute and Alford’s indictment because the purpose of the 
statute was “to prevent forest fires” in national parks, and therefore “the danger 
depend[ed] upon the nearness of the fire not upon the ownership of the land where it 
is built.”49 Alford’s broad interpretation of the Property Clause is not unique; it stands 
in a long line of early-to-mid-twentieth century case law which once again reaffirmed 
that the “power over public lands thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.”50 
B. Kleppe v. New Mexico. 
The 1976 case of Kleppe v. New Mexico51—the Supreme Court’s last case 
directly interpreting the Property Clause52—did not depart from the historically 
broad interpretation of the Property Clause. In fact, Kleppe seemingly furthered the 
reach of the Property Clause to allow for the regulation of wild animals.53 In Kleppe, 
the Court held that the Property Clause gave Congress expansive powers to regulate 
federal land and wildlife thereon.54 The analytical framework behind this holding 
was central to the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in County of Otero.55 Because Kleppe 
bore such a significant amount of support for the reasoning in County of Otero, an 
in-depth look at the case is warranted here. 
 
 44. See, e.g., Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928) (finding that forest service agents could 
shoot deer for federal regulation, even though shooting the deer violated an Arizona hunting statute); Utah 
Power & Light Co., 243 U.S. at 389 (1917) (“And so we are of opinion that the inclusion of lands within 
a state of lands of the United States does not take from Congress the power to control their occupancy and 
use . . . even though this may involve the exercise in some measure of what commonly is known as the 
police power.”). 
 45. United States. v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927). 
 46. Id. at 266. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 267. 
 50. United States v. City and Cty. of S.F., 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940). 
 51. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
 52. See, e.g., Appel, supra note 26, at 75(“The most recent exposition of the Property Clause from 
the Supreme Court came in Kleppe v. New Mexico.”). 
 53. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 546 (“We hold today that the Property Clause also gives Congress the 
power to protect wildlife on the public lands, state law notwithstanding.”). 
 54. See id. at 539. 
 55. See United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Cty. of Otero, 843 F.3d 1208, 1212–1215 (10th Cir. 
2016), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 84 (U.S. 2017). 
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Kleppe centered around a constitutional challenge to the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros56 Act (“Act”), enacted to protect “all unbranded and 
unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the United States from capture, 
branding, harassment, or death.”57 Passed pursuant to the Property Clause, Congress 
enacted the Act to preserve “a thriving natural ecological balance on public lands.”58 
In essence the Act allowed only federal officials to enter onto land to remove wild 
burros or horses. 59 New Mexico, however did not comply with this portion of the act 
due to disconcert among the State’s ranchers.60 New Mexico ranchers and their cattle 
had to constantly compete for range-land resources with other ranchers and also with 
wild horses and burros who depleted forage and water sources.61 Ranchers had 
traditionally found recourse from state laws which would allow the rancher to 
capture the wild burro or horse, 62 or they could contact local authorities who would 
quickly remove the wild animals.63 
Despite New Mexico’s lack of cooperation with the Act, the United States 
Secretary of the Interior refused to yield, and continued to enforce the Act.64 
Tensions ultimately came to a head when, in direct contradiction to the Act, state 
authorities entered onto federally-owned land to remove nineteen wild burros which 
a local rancher had complained of because the burros were eating his cattle’s feed 
and harassing them.65 State authorities then further violated the Act by auctioning 
off those nineteen wild burros. 66 After this auction, the Federal Government asserted 
jurisdiction over the burros and demanded that the animals be returned.67 The State 
of New Mexico refused to comply with this demand, instead filing suit in United 
States district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional 
and an injunction preventing enforcement of the Act.68 
 
 56. A burro is defined as “a donkey, especially a small one used as a pack animal.” Webster’s New 
Dictionary and Thesaurus at 82 (2d Ed. 2002). 
 57. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 531 (1976). 
 58. Id. at 531. 
 59. See id. at 532. 
 60. See Robert L. Fishman & Jermiah I. Williamson, The Story of Kleppe v. New Mexico: The 
Sagebrush Rebellion as Un-Cooperative Federalism, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 133 (2011). 
 61. See id. 
 62. Horses and burros were captured through brutal methods and then sold to be harvested for pet 
food. See Kenneth P. Pitt, The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 15 ENVTL. L. 503, 506 
(accounting the brutal, inhumane manner in which wild horses were captured and killed). 
 63. See Fishman & Williamson, supra note 60, at 134. 
 64. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 533. 
 65. See Fishman & Williamson, supra note 60, at 142.   
 66. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 534. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
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The district court, sitting in a three-judge panel,69 conducted an evidentiary 
hearing and found the Act unconstitutional.70 The district court viewed the Act as an 
excessive and impermissible exercise of Congressional power under the Property 
Clause. 71 The district court further found that: “Congress is here attempting to 
exercise complete regulation of wild horses and burros whenever found on public 
land. This conflicts with both the historical interpretation of the [Property] Clause, 
and the traditional doctrines concerning wild animals.”72 Following this 
determination, the case was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
 At the Supreme Court, New Mexico unsurprisingly argued for a 
narrow view of the Property Clause. New Mexico sought to first attack the Act by 
stating the Property Clause afforded Congress two kinds of power: “(1) the power to 
dispose of and make incidental rule regarding the use of federal property,” and “(2) 
the power to protect federal property.”73 Essentially, New Mexico argued that the 
first power was not broad enough to support the Act74 and the second power could 
not be extended to animals because they cannot be considered “public land.”75 New 
Mexico next asserted that the Act “infringes on the local sovereignty and legislative 
authority of the states, and on the states’ powers inherent in their trustee ownership 
of resident wild animals.”76 New Mexico couched this second argument in the State’s 
police powers: “The State, under its estray and other animal laws, and by authority 
of the United States Constitution, has the responsibility and the inherent police power 
to regulate and control these horses.77 New Mexico was not alone in its wariness of 
the Federal Government’s intrusion into the traditional provinces of the state. Six 
amicus briefs were filed for support of New Mexico, including briefs by the Nevada 
State Board of Agriculture, the Nevada Central Committee of Grazing Boards, the 
State of Idaho, and the Wyoming Livestock Board.78 The thrust of those amici’s 
arguments was that upholding the Act would upset the balance between federal and 
state governments and would effectively strip the states of their police powers.79 
These arguments failed to persuade the Court. In a unanimous decision 
authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court reversed the three-judge panel’s 
 
 69. This arrangement was “a relic of old federal civil procedure, which provided that a permanent 
injunction restraining the enforcement of an Act of Congress on grounds of unconstitutionality should not 
be granted unless heard and determined by a three-judge district court.” Fishman & Williamson, supra 
note 60, at 145 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970) (repealed 1976)). The decision of the three-judge panel 
could then be—and indeed was—appealed directly to the Supreme Court. See Fishman & Williamson, 
supra note 60, at 146 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006)). 
 70. New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237, 1238 (D.N.M. 1975), rev’d sub nom Kleppe v. New 
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
 71. See id. at 1239. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 536. 
 74. See id. at 535. 
 75. Answer Brief for the State of New Mexico, et al., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) 
(No. 74-1488), 1976 WL 181207 at *13. 
 76. Id. at *25. 
 77. Id. at *32–33. 
 78. See Fishman & Williamson, supra note 60, at 149. 
 79. See Fishman & Williamson, supra note 60, at 149. 
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finding that the Act was unconstitutional.80 The Kleppe Court’s chief reasoning was 
set forth in two sections: one section addressing whether the Property Clause could 
validly be used to regulate wildlife on public lands and the other section focusing on 
the Property Clause’s potential intrusion into state sovereignty 
The first section rejected New Mexico’s narrow reading of the Property 
Clause. Justice Marshall upheld the Property Clause’s tried-and-true broad powers 
by relying on decided cases that supported an expansive reading of the clause.81 
Consequently, this finding of the Property Clause’s broad power easily defeated New 
Mexico’s argument that the Property Clause only gave Congress “(1) the power to 
dispose and make incidental rule regarding the use of federal property,” and “(2) the 
power to protect federal property.”82 Instead, Kleppe unremarkably reasoned that the 
Property Clause afforded Congress rights as both proprietor and legislator.83 Through 
this expansive reading, Congress could easily pass regulation aimed at not only the 
federal property itself, but also pass legislation pertaining to wildlife living on that 
property.84 
Justice Marshall then moved on to New Mexico’s next argument that the 
Act infringed on the state’s police power and its traditional sovereign right to control 
wildlife. In so doing, Justice Marshall found that the Act did not grant exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over wildlife, but rather preempted only certain state authority to 
regulate stray wildlife on public lands.85 The Court upheld previous case law which 
expounded that states and the Federal Government can maintain concurrent 
jurisdiction over federally owned lands.86 But, the Kleppe court made it patently clear 
that, through the Property Clause, federal legislation overrode any conflicting state 
law.87 The court therefore found that the Act did not infringe on the state’s 
sovereignty. 
Kleppe seemingly expanded the reaches of the Property Clause.88 However, 
the central holding of Kleppe implies that the Clause did have some limits by noting 
“the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been 
definitively resolved.”89 
C. The Tenth Circuit’s take on the Property Clause: Wyoming v. United States. 
Twenty-three years after the Supreme Court handed down Kleppe, the 
Tenth Circuit was confronted with its own Property Clause challenge in Wyoming v. 
United States.90 Like Kleppe, Wyoming centered around whether Congressional 
authority under the Property Clause allowed for regulation of wildlife on federal 
 
 80. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 547 (1976). 
 81. See id. at 540; see also supra Part II(A) (setting for case law that supports Property Clause with 
expansive powers). 
 82. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 541. 
 83. See id. at 539. 
 84. See id. at 542. 
 85. See id. at 545. 
 86. See id. at 542. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See, e.g., Fishman & Williamson, supra note 60; Appel, supra note 26; Eid, supra note 29. 
 89. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539. 
 90. Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir.2002). 
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lands. Wyoming elaborated the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation and application of 
Kleppe.91 It is not surprising that the Tenth Circuit employed Wyoming to further 
underpin its reasoning in County of Otero. As such, Wyoming is examined below. 
The issue in Wyoming stemmed from the construction of the National 
Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 (NWRSIA).92 The NWRSIA set 
forth expansive regulation of wildlife on federal land; however the NWRSIA was 
silent on the issue of the disease known as brucellosis.93 Brucellosis is a bacterial 
disease that affects wildlife and cattle.94 The contagious disease is perpetuated by 
“artificial concentration of elk during winter and early spring.”95 Brucellosis causes 
spontaneous abortion in newly infected animals and is thought to spread from elk to 
cattle.96 
Fearing that brucellosis was a threat to the State’s cattle industry,97 the State 
of Wyoming began to vaccinate elk on state winter feed grounds.98 This vaccination 
did seemingly show signs of effectively combatting incidents of brucellosis.99 Thus, 
the State sought to expand the vaccination program by allowing vaccination of elk 
found on federally owned lands located within the State of Wyoming.100 Specifically, 
the State sought to vaccinate elk in the National Elk Refuge (“NER”), which was 
part of the National Wildlife Refuge System.101 The Governor of Wyoming wrote 
directly to the Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, expressing the 
State’s concern over negative impacts of brucellosis on the cattle industry, and 
requesting that the State be allowed to vaccinate elk on the NER. The Fish and 
Wildlife Service denied the Governor’s request, stating that the adequacy of the 
vaccination program was doubtful.102 Under this reasoning, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service would not authorize the State of Wyoming to vaccinate elk on the NER.103 
 
 91. See id. at 1226–1228. 
 92. See id. at 1218. 
 93. See id. (“Unfortunately, the NWRSIA does not (nor does any federal law) directly address the 
problem of brucellosis in wildlife.”). 
 94. See Debra L. Donahue, Trampling the Public Trust, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 257, 281 
(2010). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1219. 
 97. United States Department of Agriculture certifies states as brucellosis-free or brucellosis-
infected; a state found to be brucellosis-infected cannot export cattle without having it first tested, which 
incurs significant expenses. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391,1402 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(recounting that Montana’s loss of a brucellosis-free designation would cause the state $2 million in 
testing annually). Robert B. Keiter & Peter H. Froelicher, Bison, Brucellosis, and the Law in Greater 
Yellowstone Ecosystem, 28 LAND & WATER LAW REVIEW 1, 4 (1993) (finding that the Department of 
Agriculture imposes “expensive testing and export limitations on cattle from [brucellosis] infected 
states.”). 
 98. See Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1220. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. at 1217. 
 101. See id. at 1217. 
 102. See id. at 1222. 
 103. See id. at 1214, 1222 (10th Cir.2002). 
Winter 2019     USING THE TENTH AMENDMENT TO PREVENT FOREST FIRES 117 
Following this “congressionally-legislated Federal-State standoff”104 the State of 
Wyoming sought declaratory relief in federal court. 
At the Tenth Circuit, the primary thrust of the State of Wyoming’s argument 
was that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the states the right to regulate wildlife.105 
Specifically, the State argued that the Property Clause did not withdraw all federal 
lands from state jurisdiction.106 Relying heavily upon Kleppe, the Wyoming court 
dismissed this argument. The court found that “the Property Clause simply 
empowers Congress to exercise jurisdiction over federal lands within a state if 
Congress so chooses.”107 The Wyoming court further explained that regulation of 
wildlife was historically a province of the states.108 However, the court distinguished 
that this traditional authority over wildlife was not grounded in the Constitution. The 
court reasoned that “The Property Clause of the United States Constitution delegates 
to Congress (thus the Tenth Amendment does not reserve to the States) ‘the [p]ower 
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or 
other Property belonging to the United States.’” 109 The Court underscored the 
Property Clause’s expansive power and the Clause’s preemptive effects on 
conflicting state law.110 Citing to Kleppe for support, the Wyoming court found that 
federal legislation under the Property Clause not only regulated federal property 
itself, but the wildlife on it as well.111 With this as a backdrop, the Wyoming court 
held that “The Tenth Amendment does not reserve to the State of Wyoming the right 
to manage wildlife, or more specifically vaccinate elk, on the NER, regardless of the 
circumstances.”112 
III. THE PRESENT CASE: UNITED STATES V. BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF OTERO 
A. United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.113 
At the district court, Otero County sought declaration that the County’s 
Resolution was a constitutionally-valid exercise of authority reserved to it by the 
Tenth Amendment, while the United States argued for injunction and declaration that 
the Resolution was preempted by the Federal Law.114 Chief Judge Armijo denied 
Otero County’s Motion for Summary Judgment, while also simultaneously granting 
 
 104. This is how the Tenth Circuit described the situation in the first sentence of the Wyoming opinion. 
Id. at 1218. 
 105. See id. at 1224. 
 106. See id. at 1226. 
 107. Id. at 1227 (emphasis added). 
 108. See id. 1214, 1226. 
 109. Id. at 1214, 1226 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV §3, cl.2). 
 110. See id. at 1216, 1227. 
 111. See id. at 1227. 
 112. Id. at 1227. 
 113. For background and facts of County of Otero see supra Part I(A). 
 114. See United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of the Cty. of Otero, 184 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1118 
(D.N.M. 2015); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text for description of the Federal Law that 
preempted the Resolution. 
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the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment.115 In a forty-one-page 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Chief Judge Armijo set forth a thorough analysis 
of the case and rationale behind the district court’s decision to grant Summary 
Judgment to the United States. The opinion’s central analysis was organized into five 
parts: parts I and II pertained to the United States’ standing in the case and 
justiciability;116 part III explained the court’s denial of a public interest group’s 
Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae;117 part IV set forth the Court’s reasons 
for denying Otero County’s Motion for Summary Judgment and its reasoning for 
granting the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment against Otero County;118 
and part V explained the Court’s reasoning for granting the United States’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment against the State of New Mexico.119 The reasoning 
underlying part IV formed the basis of Otero County’s appeal to the Tenth Circuit 
and thus formed basis of the Court of Appeals’ discussion. As such, only part IV will 
be explored below. 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Otero County argued that the 
Resolution was constitutionally valid because it merely delegated to the County and 
State “the inherent police powers over federal lands that the Constitution already 
reserves to the states under the Tenth Amendment” and therefore “federal law does 
not supersede the [State Law] or [Resolution].” 120 Otero County Further argued that: 
The Tenth Amendment reserves for the state and county certain inherent 
police powers to abate a nuisance or threat on federal lands and to protect the health, 
safety and welfare of New Mexico Citizens on federal lands and because the Property 
Clause does not grant Congress the Power to regulate federal lands when the 
regulation impedes New Mexico’s sovereign police powers to protect its citizens on 
federal lands. 121 
Conversely, the United States argued that the Resolution conflicted with 
Federal Law that was grounded in the Property Clause.122 Therefore, the argument 
followed that the Resolution violated the Supremacy Clause and was thus preempted 
by Federal Law. 123 
Essentially, the overarching issue before the district court was preemption. 
However, before the court could address this issue it first had to determine whether 
the United States had the authority to preempt the State Law and Resolution. In other 
words, the crux of the analysis before the court lay in determining federal authority. 
The answer for the court was the Property Clause. 124 Chief Judge Armijo began her 
Property Clause analysis by examining the delicate division of powers 
 
 115. See County of Otero, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. 
 116. See id. at 1106–1115. 
 117. See id. at 1115–1118. 
 118. See id. at 1118–1135. 
 119. See id. at 1135–1139. 
 120. Id. at 1118. 
 121. See id. at 1119. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. at 1118–1121 (setting forth the heart of the District Court’s rationale that the Property 
Clause was plenary and did not reserve any Tenth Amendment authority to the states). 
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constitutionally delegated to the United States and those reserved for the states. 125 
The court employed a two-part analysis. First, the court sought to answer whether 
Congress had the authority under the Property Clause to prevent Otero County from 
taking preventative measures to combat risks of fire. That question was answered in 
the affirmative, and the court then decided next if the Tenth Amendment reserved 
any remaining authority to Otero County. The court found that the Tenth Amendment 
did not. 
The court couched its reasoning in Tenth Circuit precedent, notably finding 
that Wyoming was controlling. 126 Recall, the Wyoming decision found that plenary 
power under the Property Clause implicitly determined that the Tenth Amendment 
did not reserve to the states any authority to regulate wildlife on federal lands.127 
Based on Wyoming, the district court rejected Otero County’s argument that the 
Tenth Amendment reserved any authority to abate a threat created on federal lands. 
128 The district court supported this rejection by stating: 
The State of Wyoming advanced the same argument that Otero County 
raises before this court: That the Tenth Amendment reserves for the States inherent 
sovereign authority to regulate land owned by the federal government, but within 
state borders, for the protection of the health safety and welfare of the states’ citizens. 
129 
The district court then emphasized that “[t]he Wyoming court’s conclusion 
and its reasoning equally applies here.”130 Based on this reasoning the district court 
held that the Federal Government had the exclusive authority over federal lands 
pursuant to the Property Clause. 131 
Once the district court had established that the Property Clause granted the 
United States plenary authority to prevent Otero County from removing fire hazards 
from National Forest lands, the court had to next address the issue of whether the 
Federal Law preempted the State Law and Resolution. The court was able to find 
that, under the plenary authority bestowed by the Property Clause, there was conflict 
preemption. 132 In other words, the court found that the Resolution directly 
contravened federal regulation and undermined Congress’ statutory scheme 
governing the National Forests. 133Accordingly, the district court entered judgment 
in favor of the United States and found that the State Law and Resolution were 
unconstitutional. Otero County then appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
 125. See id. at 1119. 
 126. See id. at 1120. The Kleppe decision was absent from the Court’s main Property Clause Analysis.  
 127. See supra Part II(C). 
 128. See County of Otero, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 1121. 
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 131. See id. 
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 133. See County of Otero, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 1123, 1130. 
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B. The Tenth Circuit. 
The County fared no better at the Tenth Circuit. At the Tenth Circuit, Otero 
County focused its appeal solely on federal power under the Property Clause.134 
Otero County presented a more refined argument, focusing in on the scope of the 
Property Clause’s power, rather than preemption or jurisdictional issues as it had at 
the district court.135 In fact, the sole issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the 
Property Clause’s power was broad enough to abrogate all state power in such a 
capacity that a state could not under any circumstances remove destructive fire 
hazards from National Forest lands.136 The court framed the issue similarly, 
beginning its discussion of the case by stating “There is no dispute that a local 
government can ordinarily exercise its police powers to mitigate fire danger within 
its territorial boundaries,” the court continued, “The issue before us is solely one of 
constitutional power.”137 
Juxtaposed against the district court’s expansive forty-one-page 
memorandum opinion, Circuit Judge Harris L. Hartz penned an eight-page opinion 
focused almost entirely on the Property Clause. Not unlike the district court, the 
Tenth Circuit indicated that precedent required rejection of Otero County’s proffered 
narrow view of the Property Clause.138 The Court began its analysis by citing Kleppe 
v. New Mexico.139 As discussed previously, Kleppe—the cornerstone case used in 
deciding Wyoming v. United States—described the Property Clause as having broad 
powers including granting Congress the power to control and regulate wildlife on 
federal lands.140 Much like the district court, the Tenth Circuit concentrated on 
parallels that could be drawn between Otero County’s argument and the arguments 
advanced in Kleppe.141 The Tenth Circuit underscored Kleppe’s reasoning that the 
Federal Government and state may share concurrent jurisdiction over land in a state 
but, “‘where those state laws conflict with . . . legislation passed pursuant to the 
Property Clause, the law is clear: The state laws must recede.’”142 Next, the Tenth 
Circuit, largely mirrored the district court’s reasoning, by relying on Wyoming to 
find further support for an expansive reading of the Property Clause. 143 The court 
then concluded by finding that the district court had properly rejected Otero County’s 
arguments. 
 
 134. See United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Cty. of Otero, 843 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2016), cert 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 84 (U.S. 2017). 
 135. See Reply Brief for the Board of County Commissioners of County of Otero at 1, United States 
v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Otero, 843 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2016), cert denied 2017 
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Otero County appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the United 
States but was denied certiorari on October 2, 2017.144 
IV. THE RECENT REVIVAL OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT, 
FEDERALISM, AND LIMITS ON FEDERAL POWER 
Federalism, the balance of power between the nation and the states, is a 
cornerstone of the United States Constitution. The framers sought to ratify a 
Constitution that succeeded where the Articles of Confederation failed: the creation 
of a strong national government.145 However, while the framers wished to create a 
strong national government, they feared creating a government that was too 
powerful.146 Thus, the framers adopted the Tenth Amendment to pacify fears that an 
all-powerful government would aggrandize itself at the expense of the states.147 The 
Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”148 This language embodies the Framers’ intent to limit federal 
power and protect the states from federal overreach.149 In essence, the Tenth 
Amendment, as well as federalism as a whole, was intended to safeguard the states 
by “decreasing the likelihood of federal tyranny” and “enhancing democratic rule by 
providing government that is closer to the people.”150 
In practice, the breadth of the Tenth Amendment has fluctuated throughout 
history.151 While the Tenth Amendment was broadly construed at the beginning of 
the twentieth century,152 the mid-twentieth century saw the United States Supreme 
Court take up the reverse position and find that the Tenth Amendment was merely a 
truism.153 However, the 1976 case of National League of Cities v. Usery154 revived 
the Tenth Amendment as a check on congressional power.155 National League of 
Cities held that Congress violates the Tenth Amendment when it interferes with 
 
 144. See Bd. of Cty. Com’rs of Cty. of Otero v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 84 (U.S. 2017). It is 
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122 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW Vol. 49; No. 1 
traditional functions of the state.156 While National League of Cities was shortly 
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,157 the decision 
nevertheless signaled a significant reversion back to a Tenth Amendment that limits 
congressional authority.158 Indeed, while Garcia expressly overruled National 
League of Cities, the Garcia Court made it patently clear that “the Federal 
Government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by 
Congress.”159 In essence, the Tenth Amendment has since been used to form a 
common rule of construction: “narrow construction of federal power to interfere with 
matters believed best left under state control.”160 
The Tenth Amendment’s upswing gained substantial traction through the 
1990s, and its state-centered focus has passed from the Rehnquist Court to the 
modern Roberts Court.161 During the 1990s the Court began to implement limits on 
congressional power. Cases such as Gregory v. Ashcroft,162 New York v. United 
States,163 Printz v. United States,164 and Alden v. Maine165 illustrate the Court’s focus 
on the Tenth Amendment and protection of state sovereignty. Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor reiterated this focus when she stated: 
The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, 
but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment, 
which itself, as we have discussed, is essentially a tautology. 
Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the 
Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given 
instance, reserve power to the States.166 
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One of the greatest demonstrations of the Court limiting federal power came 
in the cases of United States v. Lopez167 and United States v. Morrison.168 Both Lopez 
and Morrison struck down federal statutes passed through Congress’ Commerce 
Clause power. What makes these two cases remarkable is that they represent the 
Court’s departure from a near sixty-year span of total congressional deference under 
the Commerce Clause; in that time, not a single piece of federal legislation was 
deemed to exceed Commerce Clause authority.169 
In Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which 
forbid any individual from possessing a firearm near a school.170 Congress passed 
the act under its Commerce Clause powers with the reasoning that firearm-related 
violence disrupts education, which in turn leads to a less productive society, which 
in turn affects commerce. 171 The Court rejected this reasoning stating that Congress’ 
powers are to be interpreted in a limited capacity.172 The Court found that allowing 
Congress’ attenuated argument to pass muster under the Commerce Clause “would 
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and 
create a completely centralized government.”173 
In Morrison, the Court found the Violence Against Women Act to be 
unconstitutional.174 That Act granted federal civil causes of action for victims of 
gender-motivated violence.175 Like the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lopez, 
Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act pursuant to its Commerce Clause 
power. The impetus of the Violence Against Women Act was preventing the 
economic costs associated with gender-motivated violence.176 Like in Lopez, the 
Court struck down this reasoning.177 The Court instead found that Congress could 
not ”regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s 
aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction 
between what is truly national and what is truly local.”178 
Both Lopez and Morrison recognized the necessity to protect against federal 
overreach.179 While Lopez’s and Morrison’s focus were on preventing Congress 
from exceeding its already expansive Commerce Clause powers, both opinions 
found issue with Congress’ infringement on the states’ fundamental police powers. 
 
 167. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (finding that Tenth Amendment concerns were 
raised by congressional criminalization of guns within a school zone because such regulation 
“contradict[ed] the federal balance the framers designed and that [the] Court is obliged to enforce.”) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 168. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 528 (2000) (holding that the Commerce Clause did not enable 
Congress to enact civil remedies for crimes against women, and that Congress had exceeded its 
Constitutional limits). 
 169. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 29, at 142. 
 170. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
 171. See id. at 564. 
 172. See id. at 557. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
 175. See id. at 601. 
 176. See id. at 613. 
 177. See id. at 627. 
 178. Id. at 671–618. 
 179. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 29, at 171. 
124 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW Vol. 49; No. 1 
For example, Lopez found that granting too much power to Congress under the 
Commerce Clause would unconstitutionally “convert congressional authority under 
the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”180 
Likewise, the Morrison Court stated that Congress could not regulate noneconomic, 
violent conduct based only on potential commerce effects because punishing crimes 
is a fundamental province of the states.181 In fact, the Court there stated that it could 
“think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the 
National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime 
and vindication of its victims.”182 
The court recently expounded the necessity for states to retain their inherent 
police powers in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.183 The 
Court there stated that “[b]ecause the police power is controlled by fifty different 
states instead of one national sovereign, the facets of governing that touch on 
citizens’ daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the 
governed.”184 The Court noted that this was significant because “[t]he Framers thus 
ensured that powers which ‘in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, 
liberties, and properties of the people’ were held by governments more local and 
more accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy.”185 Finally, the Court 
underscored the importance of the states retaining their independent police power 
when it noted that the “independent power of the States also serves as a check on the 
power of the Federal Government: ‘by denying any one government complete 
jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life.’”186 
The cases above exemplify the Court’s recent revival of the Tenth 
Amendment, the protection of state sovereignty, and federalism as a whole. While 
these principles have waxed and waned throughout history,187 the current trend 
certainly indicates a Court that is more sensitive to the states’ fundamental police 
powers and cautious of the Federal Government amassing too much power. 
V. ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF COUNTY OF OTERO 
County of Otero presents an interesting situation in which a local 
government was effectively stripped of its ability to safeguard the health and safety 
of its residents from imminent and potentially catastrophic danger. The County’s 
police powers were usurped by the Federal Government under the authority of the 
Property Clause. The case presents notable interplay between the notion of dual 
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sovereignty central to federalism and the ultimate power of the Federal 
Government.188 
When the lens of federalism is applied to the use of the Property Clause in 
County of Otero, glaringly obvious constitutional concerns arise. As contemplated 
below, the ostensibly expansive reaches of the Property Clause would grant Congress 
the ability to subsume a state or county’s fundamental police power rights. 
Furthermore, the “checks and balances” guaranteed by the Constitution are 
effectively absent under the Property Clause jurisprudence when one considers the 
extensive judicial deference shown to Congress.189 This federal abrogation of a 
state’s police power and the lack of safeguards indicates that interpreting the 
Property Clause in an overly-expansive manner is completely abhorrent to the 
fundamental tenants of federalism, and more importantly, repugnant to the 
Constitution. When this is considered one is left to reasonably expect that although 
the Property Clause has repeatedly been described as nearly limitless, there has to be 
some boundary to its reach. 
The following analysis will first look at why the Property Clause’s limit 
should have been found in County of Otero. This will include an analysis on how the 
Kleppe and Wyoming decisions are distinguishable. Next, this Note will analyze how 
and why the Tenth Amendment should have preserved Otero County’s inherent 
police powers. This Part of the Note will set forth why Otero County could have 
prevailed under the modern approach to the Tenth Amendment and federalism. 
A. The Property Clause should not have controlled in County of Otero. 
1. County of Otero presents an unprecedented situation concerning 
fundamental police powers where a limit to the Property Clause 
could be found. 
In its Reply Brief, the County raised an interesting hypothetical: “[i]f an 
active fire was coursing through the Lincoln National Forest, approaching the lands 
and homes of New Mexico citizens, undoubtedly the State of New Mexico and the 
County would have some authority to enter onto National Forest lands to (attempt 
to) put out the fire.”190 In such a hypothetical, it would be absurd to find that the State 
or County was preempted by federal law from entering the national forest to combat 
the fire. However, the Property Clause and its expansive, limitless reach sets forth a 
logical syllogism that the Federal Government could indeed prevent the County from 
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fighting the fire on federal lands.191 In such an instance the County would not be 
allowed to protect its citizens and their property. Instead, the County and its citizens’ 
only recourse would be to wait and hope that federal authorities would protect them. 
Applying the logical conclusion of a limitless Property Clause to the 
hypothetical shows that the Property Clause could prevent a state or County from 
protecting its citizens—a fundamental police power and perhaps the most paramount 
duty of a sovereign.192 A limitless Property Clause could therefore be deemed to 
grant the Federal Government the ability to strip a state of one of its most 
fundamental and inherent powers. However, as explained below this extreme 
conclusion had not been reached until County of Otero. 
The facts of County of Otero present a unique divergence from the facts of 
previous Property Clause jurisprudence.193 For example, seminal cases on the 
Property Clause have pertained to the Federal Government’s ability to regulate 
wildlife,194 regulate private conduct that occurs on private land that impacts federal 
land,195 implement grazing laws,196 and lease federal lands.197 None of these cases 
have pertained to fundamental police powers.198 This is where County of Otero 
distinguishes itself from other Property Clause case law. In County of Otero, Otero 
County implemented the Resolution199 to remove hazardous, dry vegetation within 
Otero County.200 The motivation for this was, of course, to mitigate the significant 
dangers of a forest fire harming the County and its citizens.201 This was, then, a 
County merely seeking to exercise its police powers and protect its citizens. No part 
of the Resolution sought to undermine the Federal Government’s sovereign control 
over federal lands.202 When the case is understood in this light, the holding in County 
of Otero creates issues with the County’s sovereignty. As such, the Tenth Circuit did 
not necessarily have to confine itself to Property Clause precedents as it did in 
County of Otero.203 Instead, focus should have shifted to the County’s right to invoke 
its fundamental police power of protecting its citizens. This focus invokes a thorough 
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Tenth Amendment analysis, and invites the possibility that the interpretations of the 
Property Clause can be limited by the Tenth Amendment. 
The question then becomes, where can the limit of the Property Clause be 
found? This Note neither defines nor attempts to discern where that bright line can 
be drawn. This Note does, however, submit a rather axiomatic yet important 
assertion: the limits of federal authority cannot be greater than, nor infringe upon, a 
state’s constitutional authority. Indeed, Justice Antonin Scalia described this very 
same principle when he stated that “[w]hat is absolutely clear, affirmed by the text 
of the 1789 Constitution, by the Tenth Amendment ratified in 1791, and by the 
innumerable cases of ours in the 220 years since, is that there are structural limits 
upon federal power.”204 What Justice Scalia was alluding to in that statement was 
that the Federal Government’s power must recede when it runs afoul of the Tenth 
Amendment. 
2. Kleppe and Wyoming can be distinguished from County of Otero. 
a. County of Otero is fundamentally different than Kleppe and Wyoming. 
Kleppe v. New Mexico205 and Wyoming v. United States,206 were both 
central to the district court’s and Tenth Circuit’s decision in County of Otero.207 The 
district court began its Property Clause analysis by stating “[o]ur Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in Wyoming v. United States is controlling.”208 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit 
began its analysis by stating that “binding precedent requires us to reject the [Otero 
County’s] argument.”209 Both the district court and Tenth Circuit in County of Otero 
read Kleppe and Wyoming to stand for the proposition that the Property Clause has 
expansive reaches in all instances. 
The two cases complement each other; Kleppe informs and guides 
Wyoming, while Wyoming further defines Kleppe’s holding.210 This is not surprising 
as both Kleppe and Wyoming pertained to whether the Property Clause could be read 
in such a way to grant federal authority over animals found on federal lands.211 
Regulation of wildlife is undoubtedly a traditional power of the state,212 but such a 
traditional authority is not a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty. Kleppe speaks 
directly to this: “No doubt it is true that as between a State and its inhabitants the 
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State may regulate the killing and sale of wildlife, but it does not follow that its 
authority is exclusive of paramount powers.”213 Wyoming likewise acknowledges 
this principle when the court stated “wildlife management is a field which the States 
have traditionally occupied.” 214 Wyoming even went a step further by asking—and 
answering in the negative—whether “the power to manage federal land within a 
State, including the wildlife thereon, ‘is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by 
the Tenth Amendment, [and] necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred 
on Congress.’”215 
County of Otero did not concern regulation of wildlife. Instead, the case 
implicated the ability of a local government to protect the human health, safety, and 
welfare of its citizens. In essence, County of Otero concerned the right of Otero 
County to exercise its fundamental power. While the regulation of wildlife is deemed 
to be a traditional power of the state, that power is not fundamental and a state’s 
regulation of wildlife can constitutionally be superseded by federal regulation.216 
This is not true of a state’s police power. A state’s police power is fundamental.217 
As such, a state’s fundamental powers, such as protection of its citizens from danger, 
can be distinguished from its traditional powers. 
Therein lies the fundamental difference between the facts of County of 
Otero and the facts of Kleppe and Wyoming. Kleppe and Wyoming addressed the 
concerns of states who sought to regulate wildlife found within their borders but on 
federally-owned land. Loss of regulation of wildlife deprives a state of a traditional 
function, but loss of that function does not directly affect the health, safety, and 
welfare of that state’s citizens. Moreover, inability to regulate wildlife may cause 
inconvenience to a state’s citizens or, at worst, economic damage to their property. 
The conditions in County of Otero presented substantially greater concerns than 
inconvenience or economic damage. The conditions in County of Otero presented 
hazardous circumstances in which Otero County had to thin out dangerous fire fuels 
that presented imminent destruction to its people. Forest fires, especially in the arid 
conditions of New Mexico, move incredibly fast and consume everything in their 
destructive path. Such destructive power necessarily invokes the need of a local 
government to exercise its police powers in order to defend its citizens. This is the 
fundamental right and function that Otero County sought to exercise; this is what 
distinguishes Otero County from Kleppe and Wyoming. 
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b. Kleppe was decided when the Tenth Amendment was still seen as a truism. 
Kleppe, the seminal Property Clause case granting Congress broad powers, 
was decided in 1976. While Kleppe was decided close to the Court’s decision in 
National League of Cities v. Usury (which indicated a shift toward the revival of 
Tenth Amendment)218 it is more than a decade removed from Gregory v. Ashcroft.219 
Gregory has been seen as the beginning of the Court consistently implementing the 
Tenth Amendment and federalism as rules of construction to protect the states.220 
Indeed, Gregory emphasized this by reasoning that the states constitutionally retain 
“numerous and indefinite” powers while the Constitution creates a Federal 
Government of limited powers.221 If Kleppe’s holding truly supports a limitless 
federal power under the Property Clause, then its holding is squarely at odds with 
the principles emphasized in Gregory and the Tenth Amendment cases that followed. 
Gregory’s reasoning is not isolated, it stands in a long line of recent cases that 
indicated a Court that was willing to use the Tenth Amendment and federalism to 
shield the states and limit the federal power.222 Obviously, Kleppe, decided in 1976, 
predates these pivotal cases. 
While this Case Note’s focus is on County of Otero, it is nevertheless 
helpful and important to understand that Kleppe could have been decided differently 
if facts giving rise to it occurred after the Tenth Amendment’s revival. If the Supreme 
Court decided Kleppe under the modern approach to the Tenth Amendment, Kleppe 
could have had a different outcome. In essence, Kleppe embodies an anachronistic 
approach to balancing power between the Federal Government and the states. Since 
Kleppe, the Court’s approach to the Tenth Amendment, state sovereignty, and 
federalism has changed. As scholars have remarked, Tenth Amendment case law has 
since seen a common rule of construction: “narrow construction of federal power to 
interfere with matters believed best left under state control.”223 Kleppe cuts against 
this narrow rule because it allows for broad congressional powers to interfere with 
regulation of wildlife—a traditional power of the state. 
When the Tenth Circuit relied on Kleppe in County of Otero it stated it did 
so because Kleppe’s binding precedent required it to do so.224 Indeed, the Tenth 
Circuit court was judicially bound to follow the Supreme Court’s decision.225 If the 
Tenth Circuit had a Property Clause case underpinned by a more modern approach 
to state sovereignty, then County of Otero could have been decided differently. Thus, 
even if the Tenth Circuit properly relied on Kleppe, it nevertheless was forced to rely 
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on a case which lacked the Court’s modern approach of balancing power between 
the states and Federal Government. 
B. The Tenth Amendment should have protected Otero County. 
While the Tenth Amendment was the thrust of Otero County’s main 
argument before the Tenth Circuit,226 the depth of the Court of Appeal’s Tenth 
Amendment analysis spanned two pages of its opinion.227 This seems terse, 
especially considering the recent breadth of the Tenth Amendment’s power. The 
Tenth Amendment’s power has ebbed and flowed throughout history, but it is widely 
accepted that the Tenth Amendment currently enjoys a broad interpretation by the 
Court.228 The Supreme Court’s current approach to the Tenth Amendment recognizes 
that any intrusion on the Tenth Amendment is significant and any interference with 
state sovereignty “contradicts the federal balance the Framers designed and that [the] 
Court is obliged to enforce.”229 Because this is the current approach, it is necessary 
to analyze Tenth Amendment, state sovereignty, and federalism concerns raised by 
County of Otero. 
1. Reading the Property Clause in a manner that prevented Otero County 
from exercising its protective police power was abhorrent to the 
Tenth Amendment. 
A sovereign’s protection of its citizens and their property is an essential and 
paramount function of a government. Such an important function was recognized at 
the inception of this nation and has been repeatedly upheld.230 In fact, the Tenth 
Circuit alluded to such importance in the first sentence of its legal analysis in the 
County of Otero opinion when it stated that a “local government can ordinarily 
exercise its police powers to mitigate fire danger within its territorial boundaries.”231 
The Tenth Amendment is in place specifically to protect such important functions; 
its placement in the Constitution is understood to prevent the National Government 
from amassing too much power.232 The Amendment “leaves to the several States a 
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residuary and inviolable sovereignty.”233 Thus, when a local government is stripped 
of its ability to protect its citizens’ lives and property, there are implicit Tenth 
Amendment concerns—if not full-blown constitutional violations. Those very same 
concerns present themselves in the facts giving rise to County of Otero. Indeed, the 
Tenth Amendment comprised a significant thrust of Otero County’s argument before 
the trial and appellate courts.234 The courts in County of Otero essentially deemed 
that federal power under the Property Clause was so extensive that it could preclude 
Otero County from taking any defensive measures against the imminent and 
conflagratory devastation of massive wildfires. Otero County and its citizens were 
rendered defenseless against the death and destruction of a wild fire. Such an instance 
of a local government being stripped of fundamental powers begs for the protection 
of the Tenth Amendment. 
The Tenth Amendment provides that the Federal Government has only 
those powers specifically given to it by the Constitution.235 When the Tenth 
Amendment is at issue, the Supreme Court has found that one of two inquiries must 
be answered. The first is “if a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the 
Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the states.”236 
The other inquiry is “if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the 
Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on 
Congress.”237 County of Otero presents no clear-cut answer as to which inquiry is 
appropriate. On one hand, the Property Clause specifically delegates to Congress the 
authority to “dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”238 Kleppe, Wyoming, and 
other Property Clause case law has read the Property Clause to have expansive and 
broad reaches.239 Indeed, this is what convinced the district court to reject Otero 
County’s Tenth Amendment argument,240 and likewise persuaded the Tenth 
Circuit.241 On the other hand, it is undeniable that Otero County’s police power is 
“an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment” which would 
necessarily mean that it is a power the “Constitution has not conferred on 
Congress.”242 When these two inquiries are balanced, it is easy to understand the 
constitutional dilemma created by County of Otero. But, these inquires must be 
examined through the lens of recent interpretations of the Tenth Amendment. For 
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example, the Supreme Court has recently declared that the balance of “national 
powers and state sovereignty are intertwined. While neither originates in the Tenth 
Amendment, both are expressed by it. Impermissible inference with state sovereignty 
is not within the enumerated powers of the National Government, and action that 
exceeds the National Government’s enumerated powers undermines the sovereign 
interests of States.”243 Such declaration illustrates perfectly the current approach of 
the Tenth Amendment as affording the states broad protections against federal 
intrusion.244 
When the Court’s modern approach to state sovereignty is applied to County 
of Otero the answer to the two-part inquiry set forth above becomes clearer. The 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that the federal power cannot reach into the 
provinces of the states.245 The Framers “explicitly chose a Constitution that confers 
upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not states.”246 Thus, the current 
emphasis on curbing federal power, before it intrudes on the states, indicates that 
Otero County’s intention to protect its citizens by clearing fire hazards is “an attribute 
of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment.” 
2. The balance of federalism was destroyed in County of Otero. 
The concept of federalism was destroyed in County of Otero. The Tenth 
Amendment embodies federalism, which among other things, seeks to prevent the 
Federal Government from amassing too much power.247 Without the protections of 
the Tenth Amendment the balance necessary to the goals of federalism is critically 
endangered. Chief Justice Roberts recently underscored the importance of balancing 
the scheme of federalism to ensure that all fifty states maintain their fundamental 
police powers.248 The Chief Justice explained that the Constitutional powers 
conferred on Congress “must be read carefully to avoid creating a general federal 
authority akin to the police power.” 249 
Otero County is comprised of seventy-five percent federal land.250 This 
means that, under the Property Clause, the Federal Government has plenary, ultimate 
authority over three quarters of Otero County.251 This essentially precludes Otero 
County from exercising its police power within a majority of its jurisdiction. 
Practically speaking, this means that Otero County is powerless from mitigating the 
destructive potential of fires that could originate on seventy-five percent of the land 
within its borders. This comes dangerously close to granting the Federal Government 
the very same general police power that Chief Justice Roberts condemned. 
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In Camfield v. United States, the Court alluded to the fact that the Property 
Clause grants some police power analogous to the states’ police powers.252 The 
Camfield court explained this was a necessary effect of the Property Clause because 
a “different rule would place the public domain of the United States completely at 
the mercy of state legislation.”253 Camfield was implying the balance of federalism 
because it was acknowledging the dangers of allowing too much power to be 
amassed by the state. In County of Otero, the exact inverse principle occurred: the 
state was placed at the complete mercy of Congress. This illustrates that not only 
was the balance of federalism skewed, it was destroyed as all police power was found 
to reside with the Federal Government. Otero County was not seeking to encroach 
on federal sovereignty, it was merely seeking to protect its citizens by acting within 
the sphere of its already existing fundamental police powers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As fires rage across the country, wildfires are increasingly becoming a 
national concern.254 These wildfires obliterate landscapes, destroy property and 
homes, and ultimately cause human casualties. When such dangers present 
themselves, it is incumbent upon a sovereign to protect its citizens. The Framers 
knew that a sovereign could best protect its citizens if police power was evenly 
balanced between the Federal Government and the states.255 Indeed, the Framers 
sought to create a government where police powers “were held by governments more 
local and more accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy.”256 Such a balance of 
police powers is essential to federalism. That balance was obliterated in County of 
Otero. 
The Property Clause has been consistently held to have broad powers.257 
Kleppe and Wyoming conformed to this broad interpretation and formed the basis of 
the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in County of Otero. However, the Property Clause’s 
broad powers should have been limited in County Otero because never before had 
the Property Clause been used to wrest fundamental police powers away from a state. 
Moreover, even the enormous powers of Property Clause must be limited by the 
Tenth Amendment. An interpretation to the contrary is abhorrent to the Tenth 
Amendment and is not supported by modern Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. 
For these reasons, Otero County’s fundamental police powers should have 
been shielded from federal intrusion. 
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